The worth of producing an oilfield is governed by future uncertainties that are related both to changes in reservoir behaviour and to on-going production. Costs and selling price of product also influence the decision to produce further reserves. Acquisition of new information, and decisions to produce based on interpretations of the new information, are usually undertaken to maximise the total worth of an oilfield to a corporation, or to minimise total loss. Because acquisition of new information is not cost-free, future further development decisions are influenced by such costs and also the anticipated new worth assuming the acquired data resolve, at least partially, any uncertainty in expected future reserves. This paper is the first in a series designed to illustrate how one can use probabilistic risking methods to handle such uncertainties. A simple deterministic assessment is made of when new information is worthwhile. With the sole exception of the probability of a successful value change resulting from new information, all other parameters describing the oilfield are taken to be precise and it is also taken that new information resolves unequivocally the residual worth of the oilfield. These conditions will be gradually relaxed in future papers to illustrate their importance to the decisionmaking process. Systematically varying the probability of success, which is the sole unknown, allows one to assess when anticipated new net gains would exceed those by continuing production of the field the way it is. In particular, one can determine how high the success probability needs to be for such an eventuality and compare this value against a corporate-mandated Minimum Acceptable Chance in order to make a decision consistent with the corporate constraints. To assess the uncertainty, measures of bulk volatility and also of upside and downside volatile risk are used as yardsticks. Simple numerical examples are provided to show how these factors can be quantified and used in oilfield development and production situations.
I. Introduction
The usual corporate motivation in producing an oilfield is to attempt to maximise the total worth to the corporation throughout the life of the field or, if such is not possible, to come as close as one can to the theoretical maximum and, under any conditions, to at least minimise the total loss potential.
In the long-term development of oil fields to strive towards such corporate goals there are many future uncertainties, both in terms of reservoir behaviour and changes in the on-going production as a result of prior actions that were invoked to influence productivity, and also in terms of current and future selling price of product including inflation rates that influence both costs and future anticipated gains.
The main thrust of this series of papers is to show how one goes about assessing the change in worth of an oil field as a consequence of decisions to acquire further information in attempts to resolve better either the reservoir characteristics themselves for the residual recoverable oil, or the future production of the field (and so a change in the fraction of estimated residual recoverable oil).
The acquisition of additional information is usually not cost free so that there are limits on how much one should spend in any attempt to produce the residual recoverable oil, and the limits are more restrictive as the estimated residual recoverable oil reserves decline. Additional data may end up providing one of several possible results: (i) an improvement in estimated recoverable reserves (ii) a decrease in estimated recoverable reserves; (iii) no change in reserve estimates;(iv) no better knowledge than one had about the reserves picture; (v) a hint that further detailed studies may help resolve the reserves picture better. In this last case one then has once again to decide whether it is worthwhile to undertake the further studies indicated, which also cost money.
At some stage in the life of the field such extra costs would be so prohibitive relative to anticipated new gains that, if undertaken, the outcome would be a decision to abandon the field as no longer cost effective. The decisions of whether to undertake the additional data acquisition or the further studies then depend on when in the life of the field they are to be undertaken and the future anticipated possible increase in gains, bearing also in mind the fluctuations in the future selling price of product.
There is then an uncertainty on the probability that such combined studies will resolve anything at all, or the level at which they will resolve uncertainty. Because each corporation has some minimal acceptable chance (MAC) it invokes to provide an acceptable level of likely being successful, one also has to ascertain whether a decision to proceed with acquisition or further studies satisfies the corporate mandates.
Unfortunately, the decisions that have to be made to commit resources to address the concerns of attempting to improve producible reserves by acquiring additional data or undertaking even more studies thereafter, have to be undertaken prior to the results of the acquisition or further studies being known. There is then some risk involved in related costs that may end up giving a more negative assessment of the field. This series of papers has been set up in order to address these and ancillary problems in a systematic manner, starting with the so-called deterministic aspects and gradually developing the procedures to include the probabilistic uncertain nature of parameters entering the assessment process. The general decision-tree diagram illustrating all the components that can go into such an analysis is given in Figure 1 . Appendix B illustrates an Excel spreadsheet that includes the various aspects of the general problem shown in Figure l .
Figure l . Decision-tree diagram illustrating some of the complexities and unknowns
in development and production of an oil field with acquisition of data and with determinations of the various possible outcomes that can arise.
The Excel spreadsheet can be interfaced smoothly with probabilistic programs (such as Crystal Ball ® ) so that it is then relatively easy to take deterministic calculations with precisely given parameter values, to then allow the parameter values to be uncertain, and so to produce probabilistic risked contributions based on the uncertainties. This aspect of the general problem will be considered in a later paper in the series.
What is important to recognise from Figure l is that at the time one contemplates the acquisition of new information, the field has already delivered a cash flow and one can estimate the likely future cash flow if one were to do nothing more. Clearly the critical ingredient in the decision to acquire (or not) new information is whether one anticipates the field is almost done or is still likely to yield considerable profit in the future. The relative worth of such cash flow in relation to anticipated costs of data acquisition, and to the probability the new data will resolve better the future potential of the field, are the crucial ingredients one needs in the first instance to decide whether to proceed "as is" or acquire new information.
In this first paper in the series we concentrate on the simplest situation in which the acquisition of new information completely resolves uncertainty on the future worth of the field but it is not known whether the resolution will increase or decrease the worth. In this case one does not need the complete Excel spreadsheet code exhibited in Appendix B because with 100% resolution there is no need to contemplate further studies at all. The general spreadsheet program of Appendix B then reduces to the special version of the program exhibited in Appendix A which is the version of relevance for this paper. In later papers when the acquired data do not completely resolve the situation, one needs the more general form of Appendix B, which is why we have included it in this first paper so we can merely refer to it in later papers without the need to constantly repeat the same Appendix again and again.
II. TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT a. Basic Parameters
In this section we examine the simplest situation where a field has been producing for a while and has delivered (in fixed year dollars) a total gain of $70MM with costs to date of $30MM for a net present-day value (NPV) of $40MM ($70-$30MM). If no further extraordinary effort is made to change knowledge of the producible reserves in the field, it is estimated that future gains (G) should be $20MM and future costs (C) are estimated at $5MM, for a future NPV of $l5MM. However, because the future gains and costs depend on estimates of the recoverable product and also depend on the future selling price of product, both of which are not known with precision, there is estimated to be only a probability (p g ) of 80% that the future gains of $20MM will be realised. Likewise, because there is uncertainty on the future costs it is estimated that there is only a 70% chance (p c ) the future costs will be $5MM. Crudely put, the introduction of the probabilities p g and p s allows one to adjust future gain and cost estimates from the maximum values G and C by simply adjusting two parameters. The expected NPV (EV) under such assumptions is then EV= p g G -p c C = $12.5MM. The corporation wants to determine if additional acquisition of data is likely to improve these figures.
For instance, it may happen that the reservoir in question is a very heterogeneous carbonate with highly irregular porosity and permeability and one wishes to determine if any sweet spots are left that will improve total production (WesternGeco, 2002) . This particular example led WesternGeco to build a reservoir model tied to inverted seismic impedance and well data, from which were identified a series of potential sweet spots in weathered carbonates. This potential pay was reached through geo-steering horizontal wells, resulting in increased production. In this case the acquired information cost is a combination of well data, seismic, people's time, and horizontal drilling costs, including drilling any of the potential sweet spots that turned out to be dry. The question is whether the additional costs exceed the difference between increased reserve production value and the future expected worth ($12.5MM for our simple illustration) if no further information had been used.
Take it that information acquisition will resolve the uncertainty about potential increases or decreases in the producible reserves, so that there would be no need for any further studies because of an unresolved component. Let the cost of acquiring information be set at $10MM. What is unknown here is the probability that the resolution will yield an increase in the producible reserve estimates and the dollar value to be ascribed to such an increase, both in terms of costs of extraction and likely gains. Based on the resolution one provides estimates of such financial values, but prior to actual production and selling of product one does not have a sharp set of figures. Equally, if the resolution is negative, in the sense that the new information indicates less reserves producible than prior to the acquisition, then the corporation is faced with the two options of either producing the residual reserves or of abandoning the field as no longer commercially viable. The general spreadsheet of Appendix B incorporates all these options, while the various alternatives needed in this paper for the case of 100% resolution provided by the new information (the Appendix A spreadsheet) are as follows: Note that because of the assumption that the acquired information will indeed resolve any and all uncertainty, the entry "Prob. Add. Info Resolves Uncertainty" is unity in Table 1 . Based upon whatever results are achieved by the acquisition and interpretation of the new data, a decision has to be made to proceed or not with further development of the field. If one proceeds there is no guarantee that there will be economic success and, further, the costs and estimated gains are also uncertain. Marked in Table l , in a self-explanatory way, are the values for the simple example to be discussed further here.
b . Variable Success Probability
To illustrate how one can decide on the worth of undertaking the acquisition of new information we have kept all parameters in Table 1 fixed with the sole exception of the probability (that a decision to proceed will lead to success), which is varied from 0 to 100% systematically. Using the procedure in Appendix A we then calculate the P16, P50 and P84 values. These values are the amounts (in $) at which one has 84% chance the worth will be less than P84, 50% chance the value will be less than P50, and only 16% chance the worth will be less than P16. The procedure for calculating such values has been extensively developed elsewhere (see many references in Lerche and McKay, l999) and there is no need to repeat such calculation methods again. Shown on Figure 2 , for the parameters of Table 1 , are the respective curves of worth for P16, P50 and P84 as the probability is increased that a decision to proceed will lead to a success. Note that at low success probabilities all three curves suggest that the worth is negative, indicating that either the cost of the additional acquisition was too high or the resolution provided by the new information lowered the chances of obtaining a successful outcome. As the probability of success increases however, the curves cross zero worth and, at high success probabilities, rise dramatically-indicating that there is a high chance one will be successful in realising the net gains of $60MM ($90MM minus the costs of the development ($20MM) minus the costs ($10MM) of acquiring the new information).
Figure 2.
Curves illustrating the Pl 67 P50 and P84 worth values as the probability of success varies for the parameters used in Table 1 . The straight line, marked EV = $12.5MM, is the worth of the field under ongoing production as is.
For comparison there is a straight line drawn across Figure 2 at the value marked EV=$12.5MM, which is the return the field will give if no acquisition of new information is undertaken. Note that the curve representing the P16 value crosses the EV line at a success probability of about 75%, the P50 value at about 61%, and the P84 value at about 43%.
Thus if one were to contemplate undertaking the acquisition of further data, the decision to proceed would depend on the estimate one could give for a successful outcome. For instance, only for a success chance of 6l% or greater would one consider the P50 value as yielding a more likely higher return than the continuation of the field development as is. If a corporation is risk averse, it might use the P16 curve and so require a success estimate to exceed 75% in order to acquire data, a risk neutral corporation might use the P50 value and so require a lower success estimate of 61%, while a risk aggressive corporation might use the P84 curve and so require only a 43% success estimate.
c. Volatility Concerns
Because the estimates for success probability are just that, estimates, it is often the case that a corporation requires some idea of how uncertain the estimate is. Measures of this volatility in the estimate of success probability are provided in two ways: by bulk volatility, v, and by the skew-bias volatility, v + /v -. The bulk volatility is represented by v = (P84-P16)/P50, and so at any value chosen for worth considerations (such as the EV of $12.5MM used above) one can compute the dynamic range around the P50 value used as a risk neutral estimate. If the volatility is low (v<<1) then the P50 value has little uncertainty, whereas if high (v>>1) then there is cause for concern on the accuracy of the estimate. For the situation where the worth estimate is chosen to be measured by the cross-over of the EV value one has v = (75-43)/61 = 0.52 which, while not extremely low compared to unity, does indicate that there is crudely only a bulk uncertainty of around 50% on the risk neutral worth of proceeding.
However, one problem with this single measure of uncertainty is that it does not inform on whether the risk variation in the estimate of success probability occurs to the high side of the risk neutral P50 value or to the low side. To address this concern one then constructs two quantities v+ = (P50-P84)/P50 and v = (Pl6-P50)/P50, and also the ratio v + /vat a given choice of the success probability or worth estimate. The quantity v + provides a measure of the high side range, while the quantity vprovides the same measure for the low side, while the skew-bias ratio, v + /v -, provides an idea of the amount by which the high side uncertainty is skewing the risk neutral estimate relative to the low side. For the situation where one chooses to use the crossing of each curve at the EV value, as above, one has v + = (61-43)/61 = 0.30, v -= (75-61)/61 = 0.23 and v + /v -= l .31.
The implication is that there is a 31 % skew bias (v + /v --1) in favour of the upside risk, described by v + , compared to the downside risk, described by v -, at the choice of EV as the comparison marker. One might choose to compensate for this trending bias by being more conservative in risking the worth of the additional data acquisition and its implications for further successful development of the field.
One way to play this conservative game is to reject as unacceptable a 43% chance of success (at the high risk end as measured by P84) for the further decision to proceed. Either one insists on a higher probability of success (and so a corporate mandated Minimum Acceptable Chance-MAC) than 43% to cross the EV line (for further continuation of field production the way it is), or one argues for lower potential costs and higher potential gains for the putative new components of the yet to be discovered reserves, and so raises the worth of proceeding. A third option is to have both occur of course; while a fourth option is to return to the estimates of field production the way it is and try to estimate better the fraction of total maximum gains and to estimate better the fraction of total maximum costs. This option basically changes the EV of the field as it now is, and so one slices through Figure 2 with a straight lie that is either higher or lower than the line plotted at $12.5MM. In turn, such a change does nothing to the parameters assessed in Table 1 for the additional data acquisition value estimates, it just changes the estimates of how much current production will bring to the corporate coffers if continued as is.
There is also the observation that paying as little as possible for the data acquisition and estimating as high as possible the gains if one were to be successful, are both factors that play roles in assessing the worth of both acquiring additional data and also of influencing decisions to proceed. This particular problem will be discussed in the next paper in the series when not only will the success probability be considered as variable but also the parameters that have been held fixed in this paper. The dominant question then will be: Which of the parameters and their uncertainties are providing the largest contributions to uncertainty on the risk of either continuing with the field the way it is or of deciding to acquire additional data, estimate likely new reserve worth, and so decide what to do to better matters to maximise potential total cash flow to the corporation.
III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Investigation of the value added or subtracted by new data acquisition to an existing producing hydrocarbon field can be an excruciatingly difficult problem both because of the many future unknowns and also the lack of knowledge of what it is that any data acquired will yield as either enhancements or diminutions to the current estimates of field worth. In addition, there is never the guarantee one will be successful in providing an improvement in total cash flow; it can happen that one spends the money to acquire new data in order to cover all possible likely future questions from management but not from any firm conviction one will be sharpening an assessment of likely potential maximal revenue return. The purpose of this series of papers is to examine facets of this general problem, using as a springboard the decision-tree flow diagram shown in Figure 1 . This first paper in the series has treated the simplest possible situation with every parameter held constant except the probability of a successful venture, and also with the additional data acquired definitively resolving the unknown. As a simple illustration of how one can use probabilistic risk methods to provide information helping oil corporation decisions to proceed or not, this example provides a clean representation of how one brings to bear such procedures. However, as commented in text, reality is more complex in most cases, and 100% resolution is usually never the case, nor are other parameters that well determined.
As we progress through this series of papers we will gradually increase the complexity of the situations being investigated, but always developing the next situation with prior simpler situations as a supporting base from which the next development can be made. It is for this reason that this first paper has eschewed the more complex, but more appropriate, problems arising from uncertainties of any and even all parameters available for use in the general Excel spreadsheet model of Appendix B. 1 AND FIGURE 1) .
APPENDIX A. SPECIAL CASE OF THE GENERAL PROGRAM OF APPENDIX B WHEN THE ACQUIRED DATA RESOLVE COMPLETELY THE SITUATION (SEE TABLE

VALUE OF ADDED INFORMATION
Base case parameters without
Asterisks denote useradded information adjustable parameters Cumulative prob(%) that value with additional info purchase is greater than EV without = 35.4961319% P10, P50 and P90 Values Before committing to additional information purchase at 10$MM mu=sqrt(ln(1+F65*F65/(F57lF57))) = 1.36113831 x16 = 1.7664699 x50 = 6.89034707 x84 = 26.8767007
Cumulative probability of obtaining project value at fixed percentages P10 = 1.72090588$MM -10% chance value will be less than this amount P50 = 6.89034707 $MM -50% chance value will be less than this amount P90 = 34.4522438 $MM -90% chance value will be less than this amount
MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE CHANCE (MAC) ESTIMATES
Before commitment to additional info purchase (Percentage must be less than 100 and greater than 0 ) FIGURE 1) .
VALUE OF ADDED INFORMATION
Base case parameters without added
Asterisks denote user-adjustable information parameters 
CALCULATION OF WORTH AND ASSOCIATED QUANTITIES
Expected Value Calculation
Group 1 
Risked Probability Basis of Comparison
After committing to additional information purchase at 10$MM Cost of further study = 20$MM V=F72 = -16.2 a(V)=(V-F71)/2**0.5*F62 = -0.024423 Cumulative prob.(%) that value after further study is greater than EV without study = 51.3775722%
Before committing to additional information purchase at 10$MM V=F76 = 12.5 a(V)=(V-F75)/2**0.5*F65 = 0.26467221 Cumulative prob(%) that value with additional info purchase is greater than EV without = 35.4961319%
P10, P50 and P90 Values
After commitment to additional info purchase at 10$MM mu=sqrt(ln(1+F62*F62/F71*F71)) = 1.08746422 x16 = 2.87373932 x50 = 8.52564174 x84 = 25.2933753
Cumulative probability of obtaining project value at fixed percentages P10 = 6.38468581 $MM-10% chance value will be less than this amount P50 = 8.52564174 $MM-50% chance value will be less than this amount P90 = -18.969921 $MM-90% chance value will be less than this amount Before commitment to additional info purchase at 10$MM mu=sqrt(ln(1+F65*F65/(F57**F57))) = 1.36113831 x16 = 1.7664699 x50 = 6.89034707 x84 = 26.8767007
Cumulative probability of obtaining project value at fixed percentages P10 = 1.72090588$MM-10% chance value will be less than this amount $MM-50% chance value will be less than this P50 = 6.89034707 amount $MM-90% chance value will be less than this P90 = 34.4522438 amount
COMPARISON OF BEFORE TO AFTER CHANCES
Change in cumulative probability as consequence of purchasing additional info delta P10 = 4.66377993 delta P50 = 15.4159888 delta P90 = 53.4221648
MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE CHANCE (MAC) ESTIMATES
After commitment to additional info purchase MAC(%) = 40% *(Percentage must be less than 100 and greater than 0) Worth of further study Worth of further study = 5.02187529$MM on = 0.8$MM needed to be acceptable at MAC basis of EV comparison Cost of further study = 20$MM Difference (+worth exceeds cost,-cost exceeds worth) at the MAC value assigned = 25 02 l8753$MM Worth difference (ls needed worth > or < than EV comparison worth, + is >, -is <) = -5.82
Before commitment to additional info purchase MAC(%) = 65% *(Percentage must be less than 100 and greater than 0)
Worth of additional info on Worth of additional info = 0.55190177$MM on = -15.1$MM needed to be acceptable at MAC basis of EV comparison Cost of additional info = 10$MM Difference(+worth exceeds cost, -cost exceeds worth) at the MAC value assigned = 9.44809823$MM Worth difference (ls needed worth> or < than EV comparison worth, + is > -is <) 15.65 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Value of Additional Information
